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1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis, triggered in mid-2007, has highlighted the severe and
long-lasting consequences that nancial frictions have on the economies. After the
outbreak of the crisis, the power of the credit markets to provide liquidity to the
economies has been weakened, which is delaying economic recovery in most developed
countries. Since the natural mechanisms of the credit markets are not operating
exibly and, as a result, the countriesoutput is being seriously a¤ected, central banks
have adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, monetary authorities have
implemented a very expansive monetary policy through near zero nominal interest
rates and, on the other, they have provided direct lending to private markets in order
to ensure the necessary liquidity to satisfy the real demand. However, neither the
lax monetary policy nor the direct liquidity injections appear to be appeasing the
short-term negative e¤ects of the crisis. This fact leads us to think that the recovery
may take some time because the e¤ects of the nancial crisis could be reaching the
long-term dynamics. Hence, we need economic models of the highest accuracy that
connect the short and long term in order to provide a deeper perspective. Further
study of the key macroeconomic roles of the nancial and monetary markets is crucial
not only to explain business cycles, but also to better understand the long-run path
of the economies.
So far, the literature has not considered endogenous economic growth and trend
ination together in models with sticky prices and frictions in the nancial markets.
The analysis of the factors that explain economic growth is a well-known eld of
study, and the inclusion of nancial rigidities in macro models is not unusual nowa-
days, especially since the outbreak of the nancial crisis. Nevertheless, to the best of
our knowledge, the two analyses have never been merged. It is uncommon to combine
economic growth with monetary issues, even less so with models with nancial fric-
tions that usually address short-term relationships. Economic growth is considered
a long-term phenomenon that should not be taken into account when analyzing the
short-term behavior. However, dynamic macroeconomic models in the short run are
built around a trend which must be consistent with economic growth. If none of the
short-term elements a¤ects the steady state, so that the latter acts only as a trend
reference, this distinction would not be ignoring anything important.
If any feature of the short-term behavior alters the steady state, then the situation
is quite di¤erent. Disregarding long and short-term interactions would then cause a
misunderstanding of the macroeconomic behavior, not only in the short but also in
the long run. This paper widens the macroeconomic benchmark model by considering
a range of issues that have not yet been addressed simultaneously in order to derive
some key implications for the monetary policy performance. We design a theoretical
model which combines elements that may be critical for the interactions between the
short and long term by modifying the DSGE New Keynesian framework.
To adopt the long-term perspective, we include endogenous economic growth,
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driven by the stock of knowledge generated by capital accumulation. In addition, we
consider nancial frictions in the credit markets. Furthermore, we allow the central
bank to implement unconventional monetary policy in crisis periods by direct lending
to non-nancial rms. Finally, we remove the assumption of zero ination in the
steady state. With all these elements, we focus on the relationship between real and
nancial variables and the performance of monetary policy in the short and the long
run.
Macroeconomic research has developed accurate models to evaluate monetary
policy including nominal rigidities, among them, Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets
and Wouters (2007). However, the assumption that nancial markets are completely
exible has been prevalent in the academic literature. Bearing in mind the facts
discussed above, it seems that the rigidities in the credit markets, which are strategic
for the economic system, have amplied and extended the impact of the crisis. The
critical importance of these markets for the performance of the monetary policy has
attracted interest since Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist published their seminal paper
in 1999 in which they introduce the so-called nancial accelerator. The basic idea of
this approach is the amplifying e¤ects that credit markets have on business cycles due
to the rigidities in this sector which are based on the limitation of non-nancial rms
in obtaining investment funds as a result of their balance sheet constraints. Other
works that highlight the importance of nancial rigidities are Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Recently,
Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), Christensen and Dib (2008), Brunnermeier et al. (2009)
and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010) have examined several topics related
to this issue from di¤erent angles. An excellent survey of past and recent work is
Brunnermeier et al. (2012). These studies conclude that the e¤ects of monetary policy
shocks are larger and more persistent when taking nancial frictions into account.
Given the altered ow of credit and the resulting slowdown in the economic recov-
ery, as well as the reaching of the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates, one of
the various proceedings taken by central banks to solve the nancial distress has been
to implement unconventional monetary policy measures by issuing direct loans or by
injecting immediate liquidity into nancial institutions. Such policies are designed to
soften the negative e¤ects of disruptions related to the valuation of assets, but the
study of their consequences is still at an early stage, as noted by Joyce et al. (2012).
These authors also point out the lack of e¤ectiveness and accuracy of this type of
policy. A deeper study of credit policy and unconventional monetary policy from a
macroeconomic point of view is, therefore, worth considering. Curdia and Woodford
(2011) compute the e¤ects of this credit policy examining several instruments, het-
erogeneity across agents and di¤erent monetary policy rules. In Gertler and Karadi
(2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2012), the response under di¤erent intensities of
credit policy is studied. However, unlike these business cycles studies, we will try
to identify the consequences of this kind of unconventional policies in the short and
long-term by adapting the structure of nancial intermediaries proposed by Gertler
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and Karadi (2011). In this work, an agency problem is introduced whereby nan-
cial intermediaries are restricted in their leverage position to providing funds. What
we obtain when we consider economic growth in this framework is that the e¤ect of
these measures is not restricted to the business cycles, but also a¤ects the long-run
scenario.
We introduce endogenous growth into the New Keynesian framework. There are
few precedents in this eld, among them, Hiroki (2009), Rannenberg (2009), Amano
et al (2009, 2012), Inoue and Tsuzuki (2010), Annicchiarico, Pelloni and Rossi (2011)
and Vaona (2012). However, none of these studies consider the nancial sector. Some
works combining endogenous economic growth and the nancial sector analyze the
e¤ects of the degree of nancial development in neoclassical growth models, as in
Levine (1997), but do not include nominal rigidities or monetary policy rules.
Interest rate has been revealed as an e¤ective and quick instrument of monetary
policy, but also quite sensitive. As a consequence, the probability of taking a non-
optimal decision is high. The choice of variables to be considered when setting the
objectives and instruments of the decision-making process and their correct denition
is of great importance, both in the short and in the long term. For this reason, one
element that we consider essential to address the long-term analysis is the non-null
ination rate in the steady state, that is, trend ination (hereafter TI). Mainstream
monetary policy literature supposes that TI is zero, arguing analytical convenience
or that it represents an optimal solution in cashless models. However, evidence shows
that this is not a realistic assumption, since most central banks set positive targets
on ination rate in the medium-term, and the estimations of the long-run ination
rate are always greater than zero. Several contributions, including Ascari (2004),
Hornstein and Wolman (2005), Sahuc (2006), Amano et al. (2007), Kiley (2007),
Bakhshi et al. (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009)
and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), have examined this issue by focusing on
the validity of the conclusions about monetary policy in the New Keynesian models
when modifying this assumption. They nd that its relaxation changes the short
and medium-term properties of the models. Among other outcomes, these studies
conclude that the results obtained when including zero TI are not, in general, robust.
In particular, the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve decreases with the TI
and the output gap has less inuence in determining the ination rate. The only
works that have combined TI and long-term growth have been Amano et al. (2009,
2012), who nd a great loss in the steady state output arising from the presence of TI,
and Vaona (2012), who nds a nonlinear relationship between ination and economic
growth in a context in which monetary policy is not established by setting the nominal
interest rate but through the quantity of money. The presence of nancial frictions
is omitted in all these papers.
Once trend ination, nancial frictions and economic growth are simulaneously
considered in a model that extends the one used in Gertler and Karadi (2011), our
results show that the current monetary policy generates interactions between real and
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nancial variables that are reected in a direct link between the long-term economic
growth rate and the marginal gain from expanding assets in the nancial system,
given the value of TI. As this value is given by the monetary policy rule, where the
nominal short-term interest rate is decided, monetary policy disrupts the connexion
between economic growth and the protability of the nancial sector not only in
the cycle, but also in the trend. In this context, both nancial and real variables
are sensitive to the level of TI in the long run and there is a set of interesting non-
linear relationships between them in the steady state. In a calibrated model based
on the one developed in Gertler and Karadi (2011), the main nding is that the long-
run growth rate, welfare, normalized investment and nancial wealth are maximized
at a trend ination of 1.7%, whilst leverage, the external nance premium and the
marginal gain of nancial intermediaries are minimized.
The long-run relevance of TI disappears whenever there are not price rigidities but
the connection between the growth rate and the nancial variables is not a¤ected.
Alternatively this last connection disappears without nancial frictions, remaining
the non-linear relationship between the growth rate and TI. Consequently, the growth
rate is independent of TI and nancial variables without price rigidities and nancial
frictions.
After the steady state is studied, we analyze the response of the model to a mon-
etary and technology shock, showing that the level of TI a¤ects the amplitude of the
reactions. Moreover, if we trigger a simulated crisis, the unconventional monetary
policy alters the magnitude and persistence of the e¤ects of the shocks, extending
their e¤ects up to the long term. As noted before, some features of our macroeco-
nomic model have been studied previously. However, the fundamental result we nd
is innovative as it combines economic growth, TI and nancial frictions in a New
Keynesian model. The main nding is the inuence of the TI, set by the monetary
policy rule, in determining the rate of economic growth through the marginal gain of
the nancial system. These three variables, which ultimately synthesize the long-term
economic performance and are also important for the short term, are closely linked
in both time perspectives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical model is
developed, as well as the study of the main relationships in the steady state. Section 3
is devoted to calibrating the model, to analyzing the steady state numerically and to
subjecting the model to monetary policy and technology shocks in di¤erent scenarios
depending on the level of TI considered. In Section 4, we analyze the response of the
variables to a capital quality shock under di¤erent intensities of credit policy. Finally,
Section 5 summarizes the main ndings.
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2 The model
The model proposed is a modication of the standard DSGE New Keynesian macro-
economic model which combines price rigidities, endogenous capital accumulation
and spill-over e¤ects à la Romer (1986) as the source of economic growth. Financial
frictions have been included following Gertler and Karadi (2011), henceforth GK, and
non-zero trend ination is allowed. The model considers the presence of six types of
agents in the economy: households, intermediate good rms, capital producers, retail
rms, nancial intermediaries and the central bank. The agents are characterized as
follows:
1. Household members work, consume and save, holding their deposits in nancial
intermediaries.
2. Intermediate goods rms operate in perfect competition markets. These rms
buy capital and rent labor force in order to produce their goods. They are
nanced with their own funds, but the purchase of capital is funded through
bank loans.
3. Capital producers, whose behavior is characterized by an investment function
that includes adjustment costs, sell their production to intermediate goods
rms.
4. Retail rms acquire and di¤erentiate intermediate goods and sell them to house-
holds, setting their prices à la Calvo.
5. Financial intermediaries liabilities are the households deposits, whilst net
wealth and loans granted to intermediate goods producers are their assets. The
granting of loans has an upper limit which depends on the intermediarieslever-
age.
6. The central bank implements monetary policy both conventional, through the
modication of the short-term nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule, and
non-conventional, by direct lending to intermediate goods rms.
2.1 Agents
2.1.1 Households
Households are composed of innite horizon individuals uniformly distributed in a
continuum [0; 1]. Each household has a fraction  of its members bankers and a
fraction (1  ) workers. Each banker manages a nancial institution and transfers
the prots to his household. The workers produce goods earning the competitive
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wage. Households consume and allocate their savings as bonds and deposits in the
nancial intermediaries. Their expected utility is dened as follows:
Et
1X
i=0
i
"
logCt+i   N
1+'
t+i
1 + '
#
(1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjetive discount factor, Ct is the consumption, Nt is the
labor supply,  > 0 is the relative utility weight on labor and ' > 0 determines the
intertemporal estasticity of the labor supply (inverse of Frisch elasticity).
Additionally, households must fulll the budget constraint, which does not allow
the present value of the expenditures to exceed the sum of the income and the value
of the initial assets:
Ct +
Dt
Rt
= Dt 1 +  t +WtNt   Tt (2)
where Dt are real one-period life deposits and nominally riskless discount bonds
that households hold in their portfolios, Rt is the real gross interest rate,  t are real
rms prots and payouts from rms and nancial intermediaries, Wt is the real wage
and Tt are the lump sum taxes.
Moreover, we add the following restriction to avoid Ponzi schemes (Galí, 2008):
lim
T!1
Et fDTg  0 (3)
Solving the householdsutility maximization problem, we obtain the labor supply
optimality condition and the Euler equation:
Wt = CtN
'
t
Ett;t+1Rt = 1 (4)
with
t;T = 
T t Ct
CT
where T = t+ 1 (5)
2.1.2 Intermediate goods rms
Each intermediate goods producer is indexed by j 2 [0; 1] and obtains the production
at time t by incorporating the capital acquired at the end of period t   1 and by
renting labor force to the households. The markets of both productive factors are
competitive. The rms have a Cobb-Douglas production function, common to all of
them, that generates economic growth à la Romer (1986):
Y ijt = e
zt
 
etKjt

(KtNjt)
1  where 0 <  < 1 (6)
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Y ijt is the production obtained by rm j with a capital stock Kjt and labor Njt.
The indexKt =
R 1
0
Kjtdj is the stock of knowledge generated by capital accumulation,
which rms take as given, and will be our source of economic growth driving the total
factor productivity. t and zt are shocks common to all rms. The rst is the capital
quality shock and the second the aggregate productivity shock, both following rst
order autoregressive processes of the type:
zt = zzt 1 + u
z
t (7)
t = t 1 + u

t (8)
where z;  2 [0; 1) measure the degree of persistence of the shocks and ut ; uzt are
random errors. By aggregating the production functions of the rms, assuming that
they are identical and the capital-labor ratio is common across them, we have:
Y it = e
zt
 
et

KtN
1 
t (9)
Moreover, these rms fund capital purchases by issuing nancial claims in period
t (St), whose relative prices will be the capital price (Qt):
QtSt = QtKt+1 (10)
The real wage (11) can be obtained by minimizing costs. Moreover, given that
intermediate good producers do not obtain prots and return the used capital to cap-
ital producers with a relative price equal to unity, the price of the funds is equivalent
to the expected capital return (Rqt ):
Wt = P
i
t (1  )
Y it
Nt
(11)
Et

Rqt+1
	
=
P it+1Y
i
t+1
et+1Kt+1
+Qt+1   
Qt
et+1 (12)
where P it is the relative price of intermediate goods and 0 <  < 1 the depreciation
rate.
2.1.3 Capital producers
The physical capital stock, whose net investment is produced with adjustment costs,
is dened as follows1:
1We have not included the shock that a¤ects the quality of capital in these equalities, as we
maintain that it should only be included in the equations relating to the productive sector of the
economy.
8
Kt+1 = Kt + I
n
t (13)
Int = It   Kt (14)
Int being the net investment and It the gross investment. At the beginning of each
period, capital producers convert the used capital, which has been acquired from
intermediate goods producers, into new capital and resell it to them, along with the
newly created capital. The refurbished capital does not entail adjustment costs, but
only the net investment. If we formulate the investment decision problem, which is
common to all capital producers, we can obtain the capital price. This problem is
the following:
maxEt
1X
T=t
t;T
(
QT I
n;k
T  
"
In;kT + f
 
In;kT + I
k
In;kT 1 + Ik
!
In;kT + I
k
#)
where In;kt =
Int
Kt
and Ik = I
K
is the value of the gross investment-capital ratio in
the steady state. The functional form of the adjustment costs is:
f
 
In;kT + I
k
In;kT 1 + Ik
!
=
&
2
 
In;kT + I
k
In;kT 1 + Ik
  1
!2
(15)
& > 0, f(1) = f 0(1) = 0 and f 00(1) > 0
The price of the new capital is obtained from the rst order condition:
Qt = 1 + f +
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
f 0   Ett;t+1
 
In;kt+1 + I
k
In;kt + I
k
!2
f 0 (16)
2.1.4 Retail rms
Each retailer di¤erentiates a unit of intermediate good by re-packaging it. The nal
output Yt is composed of a continuum of retail nal goods:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
( 1)=
st ds
 
 1
where Yst is the output of retailer s. If users of the nal output minimize costs:
Yst =

Pst
Pt
 
Yt (17)
Pt =
Z 1
0
P 1 st ds
 1
1 
(18)
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where Pst is the price of Yst and Pt is the price index of the nal output.
In order to include nominal rigidities, we follow the model of Calvo (1983). Con-
sequently, we assume that retailers will adjust their prices each period with an ex-
ogenous probability (1  ), which is constant and common to all of them. Thus, the
maximization problem of the rms, assuming zero TI, can be stated as follows:
max
P t
1X
i=0
it;t+iEt

Yst+i

P t
Pt+i
  P it+i

(19)
s:t: Yst+i =

P t
Pt+i
 
Yt+i
where P t is the price set by those rms which change it at time t. Expression
(19) can be rewritten by substituting the demand curve into the objective function
in order to eliminate Yst+i. This leads us to obtain the following rst order condition:
Et
1X
i=0
it;t+iEt
(
(1  )

P t
Pt+i
 
Yt+i
Pt+i
+ P it+i

P t
Pt+i
 
Yt+i
P t
)
= 0 (20)
We can solve this equation for P t and, after some rearrangements, arrive at the
expression of the optimal price which is set by all rms:
P t = 
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i (Pt+i)
 Yt+iP
i
t+i
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i (Pt+i)
 1 Yt+i
(21)
where  = 
 1 . Additionally, the general price level follows this path:
Pt =

(1  ) (P t )1  +  (Pt 1)1 
 1
1  (22)
This is the standard derivation of the optimal price and the general price level
without trend ination. If we now abandon the  = 1 assumption,  being the
gross ination rate in the steady state, the price equations (21) and (22) should be
modied accordingly. We can now dene Xt =
P t
Pt
and Pt
Pt+i
= 1Qi
k=1 t+k
and obtain
the expressions:
Xt = 
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k

P it+iYt+i
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k
 1
Yt+i
(23)
Xt =

1  
1   1t
 1
 1
(24)
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2.1.5 Financial intermediaries
The structure of our nancial sector is based on the one developed by GK, who modify
the original idea of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Since this section is a
replication of the GK model, we will only make a brief presentation in order to state
notation and describe the main relationships.
Financial intermediaries obtain funds from households and lend them to inter-
mediate goods rms. Thus, nancial intermediaries are the link between savers and
investors. The balance of each intermediary f is represented as:
QtSft = Fft +Dft (25)
Fft is the net wealth held by the intermediary at the end of period t, Dft are the
deposits created by households which are remunerated at an interest rate Rt+1, Sft
is the number of nancial claims issued by goods producers that the intermediary
has in its portfolio and Qt is the price of each claim. R
q
t+1 is the yield obtained by
the nancial intermediary derived from these claims. Therefore, the evolution of the
banks wealth depends on the external nance premium
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

:
Fft+1 =
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

QtSft +Rt+1Fft (26)
Financial intermediaries provide funds if and only if they do not obtain losses with
their operations, that is, if the external nance premium is equal to or greater than
zero:
Ett;t+1+i
 
Rqt+1+i  Rt+1+i
  0 i  0 (27)
This condition always holds with equality under the assumption of frictionless
nancial markets. However, if these markets are imperfect, this relationship could be
positive. In this way, the bankers maximize their expected wealth:
Vft = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i
 
Rqt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSft+i +Rt+1+iFft+i

(28)
where  is the probability of survival of the bankers. Furthermore, we introduce
the GK agency problem in order to limit the expansion of assets, which would occur
if the inequality (27) is positive. The bankers have the opportunity to divert a
proportion  of the available funds towards their households at the beginning of each
period. However, if this occurs, the depositors can force bankruptcy and recover the
proportion (1  ) of available funds. Therefore, the depositors are willing to lend
their funds to the bankers whenever the following equation holds:
Vft  QtSft (29)
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meaning that the gain from diverting a fraction  of assets is lower than the loss
of doing it. We can write:
Vft = vtQtSft + htFft (30)
where vt is the marginal gain of the banks derived from expanding their assets,
QtSft, maintaining their net wealth xed. It can be expressed as:
vt = Et

(1  ) t;t+1
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

+ t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1
	
(31)
ht is the expected value of having an additional unit of Fft, assuming that Sft
remains constant, with the following denition:
ht = Et f(1  ) + t;t+1tt;t+1ht+1g (32)
xt;t+i =
Qt+iSft+i
QtSft
is the growth rate of assets and tt;t+i =
Fft+i
Fft
is the growth rate
of wealth. Constraint (29) can also be expressed as follows:
htFft + vtQtSft  QtSft (33)
When this constraint binds we have an equality. With Fft > 0 and vt > 0 the
bankers obtain prots by expanding their assets and we have vt < . Thus, the
maximum amount of funds that the intermediaries can raise depends on their wealth,
which can be stated as:
QtSft =
ht
  vtFft = 
p
tFft (34)
where pt can be interpreted as the private leverage ratio. This ratio increases
with vt and its limit is the point at which the gain of diverting funds is o¤set by
its cost, since the increase of this variable in turn augments the opportunity cost of
being forced into bankruptcy. We can now rewrite (26) as follows:
Fft+1 =
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

pt +Rt+1

Fft (35)
If we now redene the variables tt;t+1 and xt;t+1, we obtain that:
tt;t+1 =
Fft+1
Fft
=
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

pt +Rt+1 (36)
xt;t+1 =
Qt+1Sft+2
QtSt+1
=
pt+1
pt
Fft+1
Fft
=
pt+1
pt
tt;t+1 (37)
Given that the bankstotal demand does not depend on rm-specic factors, we
can aggregate it, which leads us to the following equation:
QtSt = 
p
tFt (38)
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If we now distinguish between the wealth of the new (F nt ) and the old (F
o
t ) bankers,
the total wealth can be stated as:
Ft = F
o
t + F
n
t (39)
where
F ot = 

(Rqt  Rt)pt 1 +Rt

Ft 1 (40)
Finally, the initial funds3 of the new bankers are dened as the ratio !
1  of the old
bankerswealth, which corresponds to (1  )QtSt 1. This leads us to the following
expression:
F nt = !QtSt 1 (41)
Combining (40) and (41), we obtain the evolution of the net wealth:
Ft = 

(Rqt  Rt)pt 1 +Rt

Ft 1 + !QtSt 1 (42)
2.1.6 Central Bank
The central bank is responsible for implementing monetary policy. It takes decisions
about the short-term nominal interest rate (Rnt ) in each period following a Taylor
rule that is specied below:
Rnt = R

t

 Yt
Y
y
et (43)
where R is the intercept reecting the structural factors in the reaction function
of the central bank (which can also be interpreted as the natural interest rate), 
is the steady state gross ination or target, Y is the steady state level of output
consistent with , ; y are, respectively, the parameters that measure the central
banks reaction to ination and output deviations from its steady state levels, and
the monetary policy shock t is dened as an AR(1) process:
t = t 1 + u

t (44)
where  2 [0; 1) and ut is the random error. Finally, the relationship between
the real and nominal interest rate is set by the Fisher equation:
Rnt = RtEtt+1 (45)
During specic periods in which the private nancial system is unable to provide
the necessary liquidity to rms due to balance sheets constraints, the central bank
can act as a direct lender to the non-nancial rms. Scbt denotes the amount of loans
3These funds are transferred by the households.
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issued by the central bank, assessed at the price of capital, and Spt the nancial claims
intermediated by nancial intermediaries, so the total amount of loans can be stated
as follows:
QtSt = QtS
p
t +QtS
cb
t (46)
To support these actions, the central bank issues riskless debt Dcbt , purchased by
households, and pays the market lending rate Rt+1. Although these operations are
not restricted by rmsbalance sheets, they do have associated e¢ ciency costs  .
The central bank is willing to pay a proportion  t of all claims, obtaining a prot of
Dcbt
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

:
Dcbt = QtS
cb
t =  tQtSt (47)
Therefore, we can rewrite equation (46) to incorporate this lending mechanism:
QtSt = 
p
tFt +  tQtSt = 
T
t Ft (48)
where Tt is the leverage ratio of total intermediated funds:
Tt =
1
1   t
pt (49)
The cost of intervention is funded with taxes and prots from nancial interme-
diation. This is reected in the following equation:
 tQtKt+1 = Tt +D
bc
t 1 (R
q
t  Rt)
We analyze the e¤ects of this kind of monetary policy specically in Section 4.
2.2 Equilibrium Conditions
The aggregate equilibrium of the economy is dened as follows:
Yt = Ct + It + f
 
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
!
(Int + I) +  tQtKt+1 (50)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are no other public expenditures
than those derived from the e¢ ciency costs of the unconventional monetary policy.
The total output of the economy weighted by the price dispersion t =
1R
0

Pst
Pt
 
ds
is equivalent to the intermediate goods rmsoutput.
Y it = tYt (51)
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Assuming that the price distribution between rms that do not change their price
is the same as the full price distribution in period t, we can obtain that:
t+1 = 

t+1t + (1  )X t+1 (52)
Including these three equations, the model is closed.
2.3 Steady State Equilibrium
Since our aim is to analyze the long-term behavior of the model, it is necessary to pre-
cisely dene the steady state and the key relationships that emerge in this situation.
Because our model incorporates economic growth, some of the variables grow in the
steady state, so the model must be normalized to show constant steady values. In or-
der to do this, the normalization of the growing variables (wt; Ct; Kt; It; Int ; Yt; Y
i
t ; Ft; F
o
t ; F
n
t )
by the capital is needed. Economic growth is represented by the gross growth rate
of capital Gt = KtKt 1 . We detail the normalized model in Appendix A1, where nor-
malized variables are denoted with a superscript k. The equations of the normalized
model evaluated in the steady state are reported in Appendix A2, where the variables
without a time subscript are the steady state values. The solution of the system is
characterized by the pair of values of G and v that, given TI, satisfy the following
two relationships:
G =
(1  )2 !
(1   ) [ (1  )  v]
h
1  G


 v
i (53)
G =
1
1 +  
(

X	
"
1

  (1  )X	



	X
 (1+')
1 
#
+ (1  )
)
(54)
where  =
h
1 + [(1 ) v]v
(1 )( v)

G

  (1  )
i
,  = (1   1), 	 = (1  )
and X =

1 
1  1
 1
 1 .
It is clear that  = 	 = X = 1 whenever  = 0. Then, G is independent of TI
without price rigidities but is a¤ected by v. If there is not nancial frictions Rq = R
and, hence, v = 0. Thus, (53) is not relevant and G in (54) is independent of the
nancial variables, provided  =  = 0, but the dependence on TI remains. Con-
sequently, G is independent of TI and the nancial variables without price rigidities
and nancial frictions.
Equations (53) and (54) are obtained as equations (A2.30) and (A2.33) in Appen-
dix A2. The rst contains the pair of values (G, v) compatible with equilibrium in the
nancial sector and the second in the goods market, given the value of TI. They de-
termine the steady state equilibrium in the plane fG; vg given the value of  targeted
by the monetary policy. We should note that, unlike GK, we have endogeneized all
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the steady state values, including the private leverage ratio. The existence of these
two relationships between the economic growth rate and the marginal gain of the
nancial intermediaries for expanding their assets (which determines key factors such
as the private leverage ratio), indicates that nancial variables a¤ect economic growth
in the long term. This is a key result of our analysis. The variable v which, in turn,
depends positively on the dynamics of the stock of credit accumulated and on the
discounted expected external nance premium (the two components of the expected
prots of the nancial intermediaries) is the essential link through which the nancial
system a¤ects the growth rate in the long run. Thus, the credit available in the eco-
nomic system and its expected returns will determine the pace and the trend of the
real activity. Moreover, the fact that the relationship between G and v in the steady
state depends on TI establishes a leading role for the monetary policy through the
inuence of the nancial activity in the growth process and its dependence on the
external nance premium, not only in the performance of the nancial system but
also in the growth of the economy. We will study this mechanism more deeply in the
calibration section.
3 Calibration, Steady State and Shocks
In this section we evaluate the model numerically in order to ascribe the values of
the variables in the steady state and their responses to some selected shocks. Table
1 shows the values assigned to the parameters.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Interpretation Value
 Discount term 0.99
 Participation of capital 0.332
 Depreciation Rate 0.03
 Relative utility weight on labor 14.1
 Probability of keeping prices xed 0.779
& Investment adjustment costs 5.85
 Survival rate of the bankers 0.97
 Fraction of bank assets that can be diverted 0.382
! Wealth proportion of the new bankers 0.002
' Elasticity of labor supply 0.276
 Elasticity of substitution 4.167
 Coe¢ cient of ination in the Taylor rule 2.05
y Coe¢ cient of output gap in the Taylor rule 0.5/4
z Technology shock persistence 0.9
e Monetary shock persistence 0.5
 Central Bank e¢ ciency costs 0.01
 Steady state value of credit policy 0.001
The values of the parameters ; ;  are standard in the literature. The remaining
parameter values like ; '; ; &; ; y and those related to nancial variables such as
;  and ! are taken fromGK. The exception is the parameter that reects the relative
utility weight on labor, calibrated to get an annual growth of 2.5% in our benchmark
scenario where annual TI is also 2.5%. This calibration ensures a stable steady state
and reasonable rates of economic growth, interest rate spread and private leverage at
any level of trend ination without reducing the consistency of the model.
With these values as a reference, the steady state is analyzed in a rst subsection
and the e¤ects of two types of shocks are described in a second one.
3.1 Steady State Analysis
Given the values of the parameters, we can nd the steady state solution in the
plane fv;Gg. In the benchmark scenario, this point is fv = 0:0052; G = 1:0062g.
Accordingly, when the incentive constraint (33) binds with F k > 0 we have 0 <
v <  . The two main equations which determine the steady state are plotted
in Figure 1, where the red line corresponds to equation (53) and the blue line to
equation (54). The crossing point determines the values of G and v that make the
equilibrium in the nancial sector and in the goods market simultaneously possible.
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We see that, while the function containing the equilibrium points in the nancial
sector is not monotonous, the equilibrium points in the goods market show an inverse
relationship between G and v in the relevant range of values (0 < v < ). This U-
shaped relationship betweenG and v in the nancial sector is an interesting structural
characteristic of the model that provides remarkable subsequent results related to the
TI. These outcomes follow from the fact that, while the U-shaped relationship does
not depend on TI, the other function does.
[Figure 1 about here]
Taking the pair of values mentioned above as our point of departure, from the
equations dened in Appendix A2 we can obtain the values of the remaining variables.
The private leverage ratio is 4.85, a level consistent with the results of GK, and
the external nance premium is 117 basis points, a reasonable value given the TI
considered.
However, these results depend on the value targeted for TI. If we consider the
scenarios within a wide range [ 5%; 8%] of the annualized rate of TI, one of the
most interesting results obtained concerns the non-linear relationship between the
long-run growth rate and TI, as we show in the rst plot of Figure 2. It can be
seen how the long-term growth rate and trend ination are positively related up to a
maximum value located around 1.7% of the annualized TI4, after which they decline
faster. Normalized investment and normalized nancial wealth also peaks at TI =
1.7%, whilst the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries, the external nance
premium and the private leverage reach their minimum. Regarding other variables,
normalized nal output, normalized consumption and real wage are highest when
TI=0.5%., while the price of intermediate goods reaches its maximum at TI = 1%.
Although normalized variables reach their respective maximums for di¤erent levels
of trend ination, Figure 2 shows in the last row that, at a point in time far enough
away, which would be equivalent to the steady state, the householdswelfare specied
in equation (1) is maximized when TI = 1.7%. The last plot displays the deviations
from the values5 when TI=1.7% for the main variables.
These ndings suggest that there is an optimal level of trend ination that maxi-
mizes growth and welfare, as is also concluded in Amano et al. (2009). The di¤erence
in our conclusion is that the optimal value of TI does not imply deation. Coibion,
Gorodnichenko, andWieland (2010) do not include endogenous growth in their model,
but also nd an optimal rate for positive but low levels of trend ination.
Thus, a shift in TI alters the steady state values of the real variables. The rela-
tionship between TI and growth suggests that the monetary policy goal of stabilizing
ination around a certain level could be conditioning economic growth and output
4The exact value is 1.72%.
5Growth is plotted as percentage points di¤erential.
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level in the long term6. Therefore, given that monetary policy a¤ects TI through the
specication and targets of the monetary policy rules and the way those rules react to
deviations in the ination rate, monetary policy not only a¤ects business cycles, but
also modies the long run equilibrium. This result highlights that monetary policy is
not neutral in the long term, conrming conclusions recently reached by, among oth-
ers, Amano et al. (2009) and Vaona (2012) in di¤erent and more restricted contexts
as they do not consider the role played by the nancial sector.
[Figure 2 about here]
To understand the mechanism described above is crucial in order to examine the
behavior of the variables pertaining to the nancial sector. Figure 2 shows the rela-
tionship between TI and some essential nancial variables. The relationship between
TI and the external nance premium is non-linear since, for low rates, it decreases
but, from the level of TI that maximixes the growth rate, it increases. After that
level, the shortening of the capital return is lower than the reduction of the real
interest rate, so the marginal gain for the nancial intermediaries to expand their
assets goes up and, accordingly, the private leverage ratio increases. The increase in
this ratio lowers the net wealth held by the intermediaries and, consequently, capital
growth falls. The coincidence of the TI level that maximixes the growth rate with
the lowest values of the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries and the external
nance premium is an outstanding result in our model. In fact, the real interest rate
and the capital return are also maximum with this value of TI. This is a consistent
set of symmetrical results that strengthen our approach.
We now carry out a sensitivity analysis in order to check the robustness of our
results as well as to determine the impact on the long-run equilibrium of changes in
the parameters that reect the structure of the nancial system. Figure 3 displays
the di¤erential in percentage points related to the benchmark steady state of our two
key variables, v and G, for a wide range of values of the nancial sector parameters
; ; !;  and  . First, we should note that the e¤ects of the parameters are opposite
on the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries and on the economic growth rate,
whilst the level of trend ination barely a¤ects the equilibrium for di¤erent parameter
values. Marginal gain rises whilst economic growth diminishes with the fraction of
capital that bankers can divert. This means that the proportion of the potential un-
justied economic losses su¤ered by the nancial system a¤ects the nancial marginal
gain and the real activity negatively in the long run. Comparing the two extreme
cases considered, the marginal gain rate increases by 6 percentage points and growth
decreases by 2. As regards the survival rate of the bankers, the parameter that could
represent the dynamic process of entry and exit of intermediaries in the nancial
6The relationship is due to price rigidities. All the conclusions are unchanged for reasonable
values of .
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system, economic growth increases with its value. For example, if  = 0:91 instead of
0.97, which would be equivalent to an easier entry, the steady state growth rate would
decrease one percentage point. This suggests that mobility in the composition of the
nancial system discourages long-term growth. Furthermore, the higher the amount
of funds that the new bankers begin with, the higher the long-term growth. The e¢ -
ciency costs of the credit policy do not seem to signicantly a¤ect either the nancial
marginal gain or the economic growth. Finally, the intensity of the unconventional
monetary policy that the central bank carries out in the steady state is positively re-
lated to growth. In the extreme case in which almost all funds were mediated by the
central bank in the steady state, economic growth would increase by 0.8 percentage
points over the benchmark case in which the central bank intermediates only 0.1% of
total funds, which is a very low proportion. As expected, the marginal gain of private
nancial intermediaries would fall more strongly the fewer funds they intermediate.
[Figure 3 about here]
3.2 Shocks
In Appendix A3 we linearize the equations of the normalized model in order to analyze
the trajectories of the variables under the proposed shocks. The denition of the
Phillips curve has a special importance as it includes, in our case, two such uncommon
elements as TI and growth. We follow the procedure of Bakhsi et al (2007), which
lead us to obtain the following expression7:
~t = 1Et~t+1 + 2Et~t+2 + 3~p
i
t + 4Et~p
i
t+1 + 5Et~g
y
t+1
where ~gyt = ~y
k
t   ~ykt 1+ ~gt is the output growth rate and the coe¢ cient values are:
1 = 
 
1   1 ( (  1) + 1) +   1 +  1 (55)
2 =  2 (56)
3 =
(1  ) (1   1)
 1
(57)
4 =  
 
1   1 (1  ) (58)
5 =  (  1)
 
1   1 (59)
7The accented lowercase letters are logarithmic deviations from steady state values.
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Thus, ination depends on the ination expectations, the marginal costs of retail-
ers and the output gap growth rate. Note that, if  = 1, this expression is reduced
to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
After linearization, to evaluate the model response we analyze two standard types
of shocks: a monetary policy shock and a technology shock. For each possible sce-
nario, Figures 4 and 5 show the deviations from each steady state value of the main
variables expressed in percentage points across 80 quarters. The darker lines repre-
sent higher TI and the lighter ones lower TI. We have reduced the considered range
of TI to [0%  5%] in order to focus on the most probable scenarios as well as to
appreciate the behavior above and below 1.7%, the value that maximizes the growth
rate in the steady state.
Firstly, to assess the impact and persistence of monetary policy on the dynamics
of the variables, we will submit the model to a standard monetary shock dened in
equation (44). Regarding the size of the shock, we will force an increase of 25 basis
points in the quarterly short-term nominal interest rate, which corresponds to an
annual rate of 1% not explained by the variables included in the monetary policy
rule.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows the responses of both nancial and real variables for the di¤erent
values of TI. The growth rate decreases with more intensity when the steady state
ination rate is higher and, even though the e¤ect is slight, the di¤erence between
extreme scenarios is wide. The e¤ect diminishes gradually but remains for up to 20
years after the shock, which is longer than in the standard New Keynesian model
due to the nancial accelerator mechanism. Normalized net investment response
and its relationship with TI is similar, though broader, to the growth rate response.
Normalized output is less dependent on the level of TI, although the initial impact
of the shock produces a response 9% higher when TI=5% than when TI=0%.
So far as the nancial variables are concerned, the e¤ects on the marginal gain
for expanding nancial assets, external nance premium, private leverage and the
net wealth of nancial intermediaries are larger when TI is higher. The sequence of
the events is as follows. The rise of the nominal interest rate results in an increase
of the interest rate di¤erential. This spread pushes up the marginal gain to expand
the assets for the intermediaries. Therefore, the private leverage ratio grows nearly
3% in the benchmark scenario. The result of these movements is a decrease of the
intermediary normalized net wealth of 4% which nally causes a decline in the capital
growth. The ination rate falls as expected, without a clear e¤ect of TI.
Therefore, it has been shown that an exogenous shock in the monetary policy rule
causes e¤ects on the real and nancial variables that depend on the TI level. These
21
e¤ects are greater for all variables the higher the TI level (except the ination rate,
which is not a¤ected by TI in terms of deviations from the steady state level).
Secondly, we will study the e¤ects of a technology shock in (7). The disturbance is
a positive deviation of 1% in the total factor productivity included in the production
function. Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions of the variables.
[Figure 5 about here]
As in the monetary shock experiment, the response of the variables to a technology
shock also depends on the TI considered, but in this case the di¤erences are mild.
At the begining, the technology shock slightly increases the growth rate without
di¤erences but the increase is greater later the lower is TI. Normalized investment
increases up to 0.9% and these e¤ects remain for 20 years after the shock. Normalized
output increases around 0.8%, and more with high TI, and the response remains after
7 years. The e¤ects on the nancial variables are similar for any TI. As a result
of the rise in the external nance premium, asset prices increase and the nancial
intermediaries balance sheets improve. These movements lead to a lowering of the
marginal gain of the intermediaries and, therefore, to a deleveraging process up to
10%. The 12% increase of the net wealth derived from the previous shifts increases
the growth rate. The ination rate drops more with high TI.
So far, we have analyzed conventional shocks, concluding that the magnitude and
persistence of the e¤ects of the shocks have been amplied by the nancial accelerator,
but also depend on the TI level. These e¤ects are greater the higher is the TI value
with a monetary shock, except for the ination rate which is not a¤ected by the
TI. In the case of the technology shock the e¤ect tend to be greater on normalized
output and ination rate the higher is the TI. The opposite occurs on growth rate
and normalized investment whilst the e¤ects on the nancial variables do not depend
on the TI level. Finally, we should note that none of the proposed shocks reaches the
zero lower bound of the nominal interest rate.
In the next section, we will force a crisis in the economy in order to study the
unconventional monetary policy.
4 Unconventional Monetary Policy
Hitherto we have assumed that the central bank only implements monetary policy by
setting the short-term nominal interest rate, that is, through conventional monetary
policy. Now let us assume that the central bank can also implement unconventional
monetary policy by acting as a direct lender. Although the central bank has to
bear e¢ ciency costs in these interventions and, thus, is less e¢ cient than private
intermediaries, it does not face any restriction. The central bank has the power to
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act as a nancial intermediary, but we assume, as GK do, that it only uses this
power, to any extent, during crisis periods. The crisis is characterized by a sudden
drop in the quality of capital, causing a rise in the external nance premium. These
movements are consistent with what has been seen during the nancial crisis. The
evolution of the unconventional monetary policy responds to the following pattern:
 t =  + b

Et
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1
  (Rq  R) (60)
where b is the policy parameter that represents the degree of central bank reaction
to deviations in the external nance premium from its steady state value and  the
steady state level of the unconventional monetary policy. We assume that  = 0:001,
a positive value but close to zero. The shock, dened in (8), is a 5% decline in the
capital quality with a persistence degree parameter of 0.66. The responses of the
main variables in percentage deviations from the steady-state level along 80 quarters
are shown in Figure 6. We distinguish four degrees of intervention represented by
parameter b (b = 0 or no intervention, b = 10 or low intervention, b = 50 or medium
intervention and b = 100 or high intervention).
[Figure 6 about here]
The consequences of this disturbance for the optimal TI and without the credit
policy are represented by the black line in Figure 6 and are characterized as follows8.
The reduction of the e¤ective level of capital generates a decline in the total assets
value. In addition, the deterioration of the position of the nancial intermediaries
balance sheets diminishes the demand for capital and, therefore, its price. Thus,
the decline in investment and its price causes a further deterioration in the balance
sheets that is amplied by the private leverage. Due to the fall in e¤ective capital,
the interest rate spread increases and, therefore, there is an increase in the marginal
gain and drops in both the normalized output and the normalized net investment.
Ination increases initially but, after ve quarters, it falls below the steady-state level.
We now focus on the di¤erences in the model response to the intensity of credit
policy. As can be seen in Figure 6, the response of the variables to this kind of
shock depends on the degree of the central bank intervention. Real variables, such as
growth rate or normalized output, normalized investment and its price, go down, as
expected. Ination and labor increase in the very initial periods to drop afterwards.
The responses are clearly dampened by central bank policies.
As regards nancial variables, the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries
depends largely on the unconventional actions of the central bank. This variable
increases by 150% if the monetary authorities do not interfere, and only by 45% if
8We only present the results for the optimal level of trend ination, TI=1.7% for the sake of
clarity and because there are slight variations between scenarios for this type of shock.
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they do so with a high degree of intensity. In response to the shift of the marginal
gain, private leverage will also increase, in this case by more than 130% without
intervention and only by 40% with a high intervention. This movement is contrary to
the predictions made by GK, who describe a deleveraging process. In our model the
private leverage ratio increases considerably, as seen in the U.S. data9, where it can
be observed how this ratio has increased about 25% from 2008 to 2013 despite the
substantial liquidity injections made by the Federal Reserve. Finally, the normalized
nancial wealth of intermediaries also depends on the intensity of the policy. As in
the previous section, nominal interest rate does not reach its zero lower bound.
Another topic of interest is the persistence of the shock in terms of the intensity of
the unconventional monetary policy. As can be seen in Figure 6, this type of policies
mainly reduces the initial impact of the shock on the nancial variables. However,
the more intense the intervention, the greater the persistence of the e¤ects on all
variables. For example, in the case of intermediarieswealth, if the central bank does
not interfere, the e¤ects disappear within 10 years of the shock. Conversely, if the
degree of intervention is medium or high, the e¤ects endure for more than 20 years
after the shock. Hence, the general conclusion to be drawn is that the greater the
intensity of the credit policy, the lower the negative initial impact of the crisis but
the longer the response of the variables to a decrease in the value of capital.
Therefore, monetary authorities should adopt a long-term perspective weighting
the magnitude and persistence of the e¤ects on real and nancial variables in order to
choose the intensity of the unconventional monetary policy. The consideration of this
perspective could increase the accuracy of the policies that central banks implement
in crisis periods.
5 Conclusions
This article extends the standard New Keynesian DSGE model with endogenous
economic growth, nancial frictions and trend ination in order to get a suitable
framework to analyze the long-lasting e¤ects of monetary policy on real and nancial
variables. In the analysis of the steady state and the dynamics of the model, we nd
that both the nancial accelerator and trend ination a¤ect economic growth in the
short and the long term.
After calibrating the model, rstly, we have studied the long-run behavior. Our
model shows the existence of a key link in the long run between the growth rate and
the marginal gain for the expansion of the nancial assets, given the value of the
trend ination. A non-linear relationship between long-term growth rate and trend
ination is one of our outstanding results where, in a model based on the one used
in Gertler and Karadi (2011), growth rate, normalized investment and normalized
9Source: SNL Financial. Core Capital as a percent of average total assets minus ineligible
intangibles.
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nancial wealth reach a maximum when annualized trend ination is 1.7%, whilst
leverage, the external nance premium and the marginal gain of the nancial inter-
mediaries reach a minimum. This is a symmetric and coherent set of results that show
the strength of the long-run connections between economic growth, the protability
of the nancial sector and monetary policy.
The long-run relevance of TI disappears whenever there is not price rigidities, but
the connection between the growth rate and the nancial variables is not a¤ected.
Alternatively, this last connection disappears without nancial frictions, remaining
the non-linear relationship between the growth rate and TI. Consequently, the growth
rate is independent of TI and the nancial variables without price rigidities and
nancial frictions.
So, nancial variables a¤ect the steady state equilibrium growth rate, especially
the marginal gain for expanding the nancial assets, given the level of trend ination.
Through the sensitivity analysis of the nancial parameters, we have found that the
structure of the nancial sector has a well established set of implications for the long-
run equilibrium, keeping the trend ination constant. On the one hand, the rate of
growth decreases with the fraction of capital the bankers can divert and the rate of
survival of the bankers. On the other hand, growth rate increases with the initial
capital of the new bankers and the intensity of the unconventional monetary policy.
The e¤ect on the marginal gain is the opposite.
Then, we have focused on the dynamics of the model following the emergence
of di¤erent disturbances. The response of the main variables to a monetary policy
shock is higher when the trend ination is high. In the case of a technology shock,
the dynamics of the real and nancial variables are less dependent on trend ination.
Finally, with the aim of assessing the e¤ects of an unconventional monetary policy,
we have simulated a crisis by forcing a decline in the quality of capital. It has been
shown that real variables such as economic growth rate, output and investment are
a¤ected by the credit policy. Likewise, the response of nancial variables such as
the marginal gain, the leverage ratio or the nancial wealth of intermediaries also
depends on the intensity of the credit policy. Furthermore, when the credit policy
is of higher intensity, although the negative e¤ects of this shock are smaller at rst,
mainly on the nancial variables, their persistence is higher, lasting at least 20 years
after the disturbance. Thus, we demonstrate that more aggressive credit policies may
lead to a prolongation of the e¤ects of crises beyond the medium term.
In sum, it has been shown that, if the monetary authorities wish to encourage long-
term economic growth, they should take care of the long-run nonlinear connections
between economic growth, the protability of the nancial sector and the main target
of the monetary policy.
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These are the normalized equations evaluated in the steady state. We must now
dene the reduced system in order to nd the endogenous equilibrium. If we equal-
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A 3. Log-linearized Model
The accented variables refer to the logarithmic deviation with respect to its steady
state value.
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Figure 1: Steady State Equilibrium for Π=2.5% 
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Figure 2: Steady State Values
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Figure	  3:	  Sensitivity	  Analysis	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Figure	  4:	  Responses	  to	  a	  Monetary	  Policy	  Shock.	  %	  Deviation	  from	  SS	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Figure	  5:	  Responses	  to	  a	  Technology	  Shock.	  %	  Deviation	  from	  SS	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Figure 6: Responses to a Capital Quality Shock and Credit Policy if П=1.7%. % Deviation from SS. 
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